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Abstract
We propose an enforcement strategy to achieve complete compliance in a transferable emissions permit
system when ®rms are required to provide reports of their own emissions. Like the literature on selfreporting in the enforcement of standards, we ®nd that self-reporting can conserve monitoring costs, but
for a different reason. In addition, we show that targeted monitoringÐthe practice of monitoring some
®rms more closely than othersÐis not necessary in a competitive permit system. Furthermore, tying
penalties to the equilibrium permit price can stabilize the monitoring effort necessary to maintain full
compliance in the face of permit price ¯uctuations.

1. Introduction
Although market-based environmental policies are quickly gaining support among policymakers, a key component of these systems has not been adequately addressed; namely,
how they should be enforced to achieve acceptable levels of compliance in a cost-effective
manner. While there is a small literature concerning the consequences of non-compliance
in transferable emissions permit systems, most of it does not deal squarely with the
problem of how to design enforcement strategies for market-based policies. For example,
Malik's (1990) work is primarily a positive analysis of ®rm behavior in a transferable
permit system when they face a ®xed enforcement strategy. In addition, Keeler (1991),
Malik (1992), and Hahn and Axtell (1995) all chose to focus on comparing the
performance of transferable permit systems to command-and-control policies when ®rms
may be non-compliant.1
This paper proposes an enforcement strategy for a competitive transferable emissions
1 We are aware of only two attempts to construct enforcement strategies for transferable permit systems.
Beavis and Walker (1984) characterize a uniform monitoring strategy with ®xed penalties to achieve an

permit system in which ®rms are required to provide reports of their own emissions. The
addition of a self-reporting requirement implies that an enforcement strategy must address
two types of possible violations: emissions violations, where ®rms do not hold enough
permits to cover their emissions, and reporting violations, where ®rms do not give an
accurate report of their emissions. Like a large portion of all environmental policies in the
United States, the current generation of market-based initiativesÐthe Sulfur Dioxide
(SO2) Allowance Trading program and the Regional Clean Air Incentives Market
(RECLAIM) programÐrequire ®rms to provide regulators with reports of their emissions.
However, to our knowledge, no one has examined the role of self-reporting in the
enforcement of market-based environmental policies. Because self-reporting is an
important component of existing market-based policies, and will likely to be important
for future initiatives, we incorporate a self-reporting requirement into our analysis.2
We also assume that the regulatory objective is what we choose to call effective
enforcement: the enforcement strategy is designed to achieve complete emissions
compliance (each ®rm holds enough permits to cover its emissions) in a cost-effective
manner. We focus on achieving complete emissions compliance because a great deal of
effort has been devoted to achieving very high rates of compliance in the Sulfur Dioxide
Allowance Trading and RECLAIM programs, and thus far these efforts have been quite
successful. [We provide a brief sketch of the enforcement components of the SO2 Trading
and RECLAIM programs in the ®rst half of section 2.] Since its inception, ®rms in the SO2
Trading program have been perfectly compliant (U.S. EPA 1996, 1997 and 1998a). There
have been a small number of violations in the RECLAIM program, but authorities attribute
these to a few ®rms that lacked suf®cient understanding of the required protocols, rather
than deliberate attempts to evade their legal obligations (South Coast Air Quality
Management District 1998).
After presenting the basic model of the paper in the second half of section 2, section 3 is
devoted to deriving an effective enforcement strategy for a transferable emissions permit
system with self-reporting. We begin by presenting a necessary and suf®cient condition for
an enforcement strategy to be incentive-compatible; that is, to elicit truthful emissions
reports. We go on to show that an enforcement strategy for a market-based policy with a
self-reporting requirement that does not elicit truthful emissions reports cannot achieve
complete emissions compliance. Although incentive-compatible enforcement is necessary
to achieve complete emissions compliance, it is not suf®cient. An additional condition that

aggregate emissions target in a cost-effective manner. They do not consider any of the issues that are
important in this paper; in particular, self-reporting, targeted monitoring and setting penalties. Stranlund
and Dhanda (1999) only consider the desirability of targeted monitoring, but they do so from the
perspective of maximizing aggregate compliance with a ®xed enforcement budget.
2 A few authors have examined the role of self-reporting, but all have done so in the context of enforcing
standards. Harford (1987) provides a positive analysis of ®rm behavior in this setting, while Malik (1993),
Kaplow and Shavell (1994), and Livernois and McKenna (1999) provide normative analyses. Although
our analysis is also best characterized as normative, our modeling approach is closer to Harford's,
particularly in the way penalties are applied, and that we allow for continuous choices. The later papers in
this literature assume that compliance is simply an either/or choice.

relates the equilibrium permit price to the marginal penalty for a small emissions violation
is required.
In section 4 we explore a number of implications of the strategy we propose in section 3.
We begin by considering the value of the self-reporting requirement. The normative
analyses of self-reporting in the enforcement of standards (Malik 1993; Kaplow and
Shavell 1994; Livernois and McKenna 1999) all conclude that self-reporting can conserve
monitoring costs because it allows a strong form of targeted monitoring.3 In our context,
targeted monitoringÐthe practice of auditing some ®rms with a higher probability than
othersÐcannot be used to lower monitoring costs. However, we ®nd that a self-reporting
requirement can conserve monitoring costs if a regulator can apply penalties for reporting
violations in addition to penalties for emissions violations.
In section 4 we elaborate on the theme that in a frictionless and competitive permit
market, targeted monitoring is not necessary; that is, effective enforcement implies a
uniform monitoring strategy. However, we argue that uniform monitoring will not be costeffective in the presence of signi®cant transaction costs or market power. We also propose
that marginal penalties in a transferable permit system be tied to the equilibrium permit
price to stabilize the amount of monitoring necessary to achieve complete emissions
compliance in the face of permit price ¯uctuations.

2. A Model of Compliance in a Transferable Emissions
Permit System
The primary purpose of this section is to present the model of this paper. To set the stage,
let us ®rst consider brie¯y the enforcement strategies used in the Sulfur Dioxide
Allowance Trading and RECLAIM programs.4
2.1. Monitoring and Enforcement in Existing Transferable Permit Programs
In both the SO2 Allowance Trading and RECLAIM programs, a system is in place to
keep track of emissions permits so that, at any point in time, program authorities know
how many permits a ®rm holds. All sources in the SO2 Trading program and most sources
in the RECLAIM program are required to install a continuous emissions monitoring
system (CEMS), or an equivalent technology, on each emitting stack. These systems
provide a continuous and very accurate measure of emissions leaving a stack. All sources
3 In particular, ®rms that report that they are non-compliant need not be monitored so audits are conducted
(with some probability) only on the ®rms that report being compliant. No doubt this strong result is due,
in large part, to the common assumption in these models that compliance is only an either/or choice. If a
®rm knows that it will not be audited if it reports that it is non-compliant and can choose among varying
levels of non-compliance, it will have an incentive to submit a report of non-compliance but misrepresent
the extent of its violation. We thank two referees for bringing this characteristic of these models to our
attention.
4 The EPA maintains a website with a wealth of information about the SO2 Allowance Trading Program
(http://www.epa.gov/acidrain/trading.html). The South Coast Air Quality Management District's website
on RECLAIM (http://www.aqmd.gov/reclaim/reclaim.html) provides only a brief sketch of the program.

in both programs are also required to submit emissions reports, as well as periodic quality
control tests of monitoring devices to maintain the accuracy of emissions data. The
requirements for reporting emissions data are quite demanding, usually specifying an
automated system for receiving emissions data from monitoring devices, formatting data
into emissions reports, and submitting the reports to the agencies.
In the SO2 Trading program the EPA subjects every single emissions report to a series of
reviews to verify the accuracy of each report. These audits appear to be primarily of the
sources' reports rather than site visits. However, the EPA may conduct site audits to
inspect monitoring devices and review on-site operation and quality assurance records
(U.S. EPA 1998b). RECLAIM authorities claimed to have also reviewed each emissions
report in the ®rst three years of the program (1994±1996). Apparently these reviews also
included site visits to inspect equipment, monitoring devices and operation records (South
Coast Air Quality Management District 1998). Although the requirements for obtaining
and reporting emissions data in both programs are rather substantial, it is not clear to what
extent ®rms can be penalized for ®ling false reports.
Because of the level of agency-monitoring and the stringency of the self-monitoring and
self-reporting requirements, it is widely believed that sources have little opportunity to
manipulate data ®les to under-report their emissions; hence, there is a high degree of
con®dence in the accuracy of the emissions reports in both programs. We should note here
that the enforcement strategy that we propose will also generate accurate emissions
reporting, but in a very different way. While the SO2 and RECLAIM programs rely
primarily on very stringent technological and process standards to generate accurate
emissions reports, our strategy relies on choosing audit probabilities and penalties to
provide ®rms with the proper incentives for truthful reporting.
As for penalties for emissions violations, the SO2 Allowance Trading program is unique
among environmental policies in that these penalties are explicit and are intended to be
assessed automatically. The monetary penalty was set at $2000 per ton of excess emissions
in 1990, and is indexed to in¯ation. [In 1998 the penalty was $2581 per ton of excess
emissions]. In addition, any excess emissions are deducted from the source's allocation in
the following year. Our analysis will make it obvious why these stiff penalties and the
effort devoted to monitoring emissions in the SO2 program have induced the perfect
compliance record the program has achieved thus far. Non-compliant RECLAIM sources
may face monetary penalties and must offset excess emissions in the following year as
well, but the penalties are not automatic and are not speci®ed as clearly as those in the SO2
program.
2.2. A Model of a Self-Reporting Firm
The analysis of this paper is based on a static model of a risk-neutral ®rm that operates
under a competitive transferable emissions permit system. The ®rm's emissions-control
cost function, c e, is strictly decreasing and convex in its actual emissions e; that is,
c0 e50 and c00 e40.5 In general, a ®rm has a number of options for reducing its
5 The standard interpretation of c e is as follows: Let e0 be the ®rm's unconstrained level of emissions and
let p e0  be the ®rm's maximal pro®t in this setting. The cost of holding its emissions to e5e0 is c e 

emissions including reducing output, using cleaner inputs, and installing end-of-pipe
control technologies. Therefore, its emissions-control costs will depend on a host of
factors including prices of inputs and outputs, and characteristics of available production
and the emissions-control technologies.6 We expect that in actual settings the abatement
costs of ®rms in a transferable permit system are likely to vary substantially and that
regulators, including enforcement authorities, will have to make design decisions without
complete information about these costs.
The ®rm is required to provide a report of its emissions to the enforcement authority.
Denote an emissions report as r and assume that submission of a report is costless.7 Let l0
be the number of permits that are initially allocated to the ®rm, and let l be the number of
permits that the ®rm holds after trade. Possession of a permit confers the legal right to emit
one unit of emissions. We assume that the aggregate issuance of permits is ®xed, and that
permits trade at a competitive price p.
Two types of violation may occur: an emissions violation occurs when a ®rm's
emissions exceed the number of permits it holds e ÿ l40, and a reporting violation
occurs when its actual emissions exceed its reported emissions e ÿ r40. We assume that
a ®rm never reports that its emissions violation is greater than it actually is, and it never
reports that it is over-compliant; that is, we shall restrict our analysis by e ÿ l  r ÿ l  0.
Of course, this implies that a ®rm never reports that its emissions are greater than they
actually are e  r, nor that its emissions are less than the number of permits it holds
r  l. Furthermore, if a ®rm holds enough permits to cover its emissions, it will also
provide an accurate report of its emissions; that is, for a compliant ®rm, e  r  l.8
Like the Sulfur Dioxide Allowance Trading and RECLAIM programs, we assume that a
system is in place to track emissions permits so that the regulator has perfect information
on the number of permits a ®rm holds. Thus, when choosing a monitoring strategy, the
enforcement authority has two pieces of information about a ®rm, its emissions report and
the number of permits it holds. We assume that the regulator bases its audit strategy on the

p e0  ÿ p e. Montgomery (1972) showed that c e is decreasing and convex when the ®rm is a pricetaker in input and output markets, but since the formulation of c e is quite general it will have these
characteristics in many non-competitive settings as well.
6 A ®rm's abatement costs may also be affected by other regulations it faces besides the transferable permit
system it operates under. For example, all of the ®rms in the SO2 Allowance Trading program are public
electric utilities, whose emissions-control costs are likely to be affected by state public utility regulations
(Coggins and Smith 1993).
7 However, the ®rm may incur substantial costs if it is forced to obtain an accurate account of its emissions.
Since it seems unlikely that these costs will affect the ®rm's choices of emissions and emissions report,
we shall ignore them.
8 Since the model is static, we do not allow ®rms to save emissions permits for future use or sale, nor do we
allow ®rms to borrow permits against future allocations. The RECLAIM program does not allow any sort
of permit banking, while the SO2 Trading program only allows ®rms to save allowances for future use or
sale. In fact, ®rms in the SO2 program are saving a signi®cant proportion of their allowances
(Schmalensee et. al. 1998). A few authors have constructed dynamic models to examine the role of permit
banking in transferable permit systems (Kling and Rubin 1997; Cronshaw and Cruse 1996; Rubin 1996),
but no one has considered enforcement in a dynamic setting. We feel that this is an important area for
future research.

®rm's reported violation; that is, the regulator will audit a ®rm that reports its emissions to
be r and holds l permits with probability p r ÿ l. A ®rm that reports being compliant is
audited with probability p 0. For simplicity we assume that an audit of the ®rm reveals its
true violation.9
We follow Harford's (1987) approach to modeling penalties. If a ®rm reports an
emissions violation, a penalty of f r ÿ l is imposed automatically. If a ®rm is audited and
found to have under-reported its emissions, a penalty for the reporting violation, g e ÿ r,
is imposed, as well as the incremental penalty for its emissions violation,
f e ÿ l ÿ f r ÿ l. We assume that these penalties are zero for zero reporting and
emissions violations g 0  f 0  0, but that the marginal penalties for zero reporting
and emissions violations are greater than zero g0 040; f 0 040. For positive reporting
and emissions violations, the penalty functions are strictly increasing and convex. Strict
convexity of the penalty functions is not necessary for our analysisÐall of our results hold
as well under constant marginal penalties, but the analysis is a bit more complicated.
As is standard in the literature, we assume that an enforcement authority commits itself
to a strategy at the outset and communicates this strategy to all ®rms. A ®rm chooses its
emissions, its emissions report, and permit demand to solve (1), taking the enforcement
strategy as given.
min c e  p l ÿ l0   f r ÿ l  p r ÿ lg e ÿ r  f e ÿ l ÿ f r ÿ l

1

s:t: e  r  l40:
Notice that we are not interested in the unrealistic case in which the ®rm holds no permits.
The Lagrange equation for (1) is y  c e  p l ÿ l0   f r ÿ l  p r ÿ l
g e ÿ r  f e ÿ l ÿ f r ÿ l ÿ b e ÿ r ÿ m r ÿ l, and the Kuhn-Tucker conditions
are:
ye  c0 e  p r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 e ÿ l ÿ b  0;

2a

yl  p ÿ f 0 r ÿ l ÿ p0 r ÿ lg e ÿ r  f e ÿ l ÿ f r ÿ l
ÿ p r ÿ l f 0 e ÿ l ÿ f 0 r ÿ l  m  0;

2b

yr  f 0 r ÿ l  p0 r ÿ lg e ÿ r  f e ÿ l ÿ f r ÿ l
ÿ p r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 r ÿ l  b ÿ m  0;

2c

9 A more general monitoring strategy would base the audit probability on the ®rm's reported emissions and
the number of permits it holds separately; that is, p r; l. All of the results of this paper hold as long as
pr  ÿpl , but cannot be guaranteed to hold otherwise. Because it is not clear to us that an enforcement
authority can do better with an audit strategy such that pr 6 ÿpl , we have chosen p r; l  p r ÿ l. We
recognize, however, that this assumption may be restrictive.

yb  r ÿ e  0; b  0; b6 r ÿ e  0;

2d

ym  l ÿ r  0; m  0; m6 l ÿ r  0:

2e

We assume that (2a±e) are necessary and suf®cient to determine the ®rm's optimal choices
of emissions, emissions report, and permit demand uniquely.

3. Effective Enforcement of a Transferable Permit System with
Self-Reporting
Assume that the objective of an enforcement authority is to induce complete emissions
compliance at least cost. In this section we derive the appropriate enforcement strategy. To
begin, we consider a ®rm's choice of emissions.
3.1. A Firm's Choice of Emissions
A number of authors have noted the rather surprising result that under incentive-based
policies, the emissions-choices of ®rms may be independent of a regulator's enforcement
strategy [e.g., Malik (1990) in the case of transferable permits, and Harford (1978) in the
case of an emissions tax]. This independence result also obtains in our context.
Proposition 1: Given an optimal choice of permit demand and emissions report, a ®rm
chooses its emissions so that c0 e  p  0, regardless of its compliance status.
Proof of Proposition 1: Combine (2b) and (2c) to obtain
p ÿ p r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 e ÿ l  b  0:

3

From (2a), c0 e  ÿp r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 e ÿ l  b. Substitute this into (3) to obtain
c0 e  p  0. Q.E.D.
Proposition 1 has important implications for our analysis. First, since a ®rm's choice of
emissions is independent of the enforcement strategy it faces, we can ignore this choice
(i.e., the ®rst-order condition (2a)) when we focus on the ®rm's emissions report and
permit demand. Second, Proposition 1 implies that, given the goal of complete emissions
compliance, the choice of enforcement strategy will have no impact on the equilibrium
permit price.10 Therefore, we can derive the appropriate enforcement strategy from a
single ®rm's choices without providing a complete analysis of the permit market.
Proposition 1 also implies that, regardless of the particular enforcement strategy, in any
P
10 To see this, index ®rms by i and note that equilibrium in the permit market requires
Ii  L, where the
summation is over the entire set of ®rms in the program and L denotes the aggregate number of permits
in circulation. From Proposition 1, ®rm i's choice of emissions can be written as ei p, which is the
complete compliance requires ei p  li for every ®rm i;
implicit solution to c0i ei   p  0. Achieving
P
hence, the permit market clears when
ei p  L. This market-clearing condition implicitly de®nes the

equilibrium the ®rms' marginal abatement costs are equal to the permit price and, since all
®rms face the same price, marginal abatement costs are equal across ®rms. We shall see
that this equilibrating characteristic of competitive transferable permit systems has
important implications for the design of enforcement strategies for transferable permit
systems.11
3.2. An Incentive-Compatible Enforcement Strategy
Whether a ®rm provides a truthful report of its emissions or not depends on the
regulator's enforcement strategy. In their analyses of self-reporting of violations of
standards, Kaplow and Shavell (1994) and Malik (1993) focused on incentive-compatible
enforcement strategies; that is, strategies that induce agents to report any violation
truthfully. We shall do the same.
Proposition 2: Given some choice of emissions and an optimal choice of emissions
permits, a ®rm reports a violation truthfully if and only if
p  p r ÿ lg0 0  f 0 e ÿ l; Vr ÿ l [ 0; e ÿ l:

4

Proof of Proposition 2: From (2b), an optimal choice of permits implies
p ÿ p r ÿ l f 0 e ÿ l ÿ f 0 r ÿ l
 f 0 r ÿ l  p0 r ÿ lg e ÿ r  f e ÿ l ÿ f r ÿ l ÿ m:

5

Substitute the right-hand-side of (5) into (2c) to obtain
yr  p ÿ p r ÿ lf 0 e ÿ l ÿ f 0 r ÿ l ÿ p r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 r ÿ l  b
 p ÿ p r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 e ÿ l  b  0:

6

For some e and an optimal choice of l, an optimal choice of r must satisfy (6).
Suppose ®rst that r  e. Then, if this report is optimal, yr  p ÿ p r ÿ lg0 0
0
f e ÿ l  b  0. Since, from (2d), e  r implies b  0, (4) is clearly necessary for r  e
to be an optimal report. To show that (4) is also suf®cient, suppose to the contrary that (4)
holds but e4r  l. From (2d) the ®rst inequality implies b  0. Then,
yr  p ÿ p r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 e ÿ l50, the sign of which follows from the fact that
equilibrium permit price and indicates that, since every ®rm's choice of emissions is independent of the
enforcement strategy, the equilibrium permit price is independent of the choice of enforcement strategy
as well.
11 We should note that Proposition 1 holds only if pr  ÿpl . Therefore, if an enforcement authority chooses
a monitoring strategy that does not satisfy pr  ÿpl, the equilibrium distribution of emissions will
deviate from that in which all marginal abatement costs are equal to the equilibrium permit price.

e4r implies g0 e ÿ r4g0 0. Since yr 50 contradicts (6), we have established the
suf®ciency of (4) for inducing truthful reporting. Q.E.D.
The reason that (4) guarantees truthful reports is straightforward. Imagine a non-compliant
®rm that considers under-reporting its violation e4r  l. Given that its choice of
emissions is ®xed at the solution to c0 e  p  0 (Proposition 1) and that it has chosen its
permits optimally, (6) indicates that the marginal expected cost of its report is
yr  p ÿ p r ÿ lg0 e ÿ r  f 0 e ÿ l. If (4) is satis®ed, then yr 50 whenever
e4r  l, implying that the ®rm can reduce its expected costs by increasing its reported
emissions to the level of its actual emissions.
Choosing p r ÿ l so that (4) holds is somewhat problematic because it requires
knowledge of an actual violation e ÿ l, which can only be determined with an audit.
However, using a ®rm's reported violation in place of its actual violation suggests that the
regulator choose its enforcement strategy so that
p  p r ÿ lg0 0  f 0 r ÿ l; Vr ÿ l  0:

7

Using the fact that r ÿ l  e ÿ l implies f 0 r ÿ l  f 0 e ÿ l, it is easy to see that if (7)
holds, (4) also holds; hence, (7) characterizes an incentive-compatible enforcement
strategy that is based upon information available to a regulator. Furthermore, equation (7)
suggests that an incentive-compatible enforcement strategy should satisfy
p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0 for a report of a zero violation (i.e., r ÿ l  0). Since f 0 r ÿ l is
assumed to be increasing in r ÿ l, choosing p 0 so that it is exactly equal to
p=g0 0  f 0 0 guarantees that every ®rm will report its true violation, even if it is noncompliant.
A couple of immediate implications follow from the choice of an enforcement strategy
to elicit accurate emissions reporting; that is, one that satis®es p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0.
Notice ®rst that it does not require a penalty for a reporting violation. However, given the
marginal penalty for a slight emissions violation, f 0 0, the application of a penalty for a
reporting violation allows the regulator to reduce the amount of monitoring necessary to
induce truthful reporting by every ®rm. We shall return to this idea in section 4 where we
examine the value of a self-reporting requirement in market-based policies.
More importantly, note that there is nothing in the condition, p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0,
that is speci®c to particular ®rms. This is due to Proposition 1Ðregardless of the
enforcement strategy, each ®rm chooses its emissions so that its marginal abatement costs
are equal to the equilibrium permit price. This fact allows the enforcement strategy to be
tied to the equilibrium permit price rather than to individual marginal control costs.
Consequently, to elicit accurate emissions reports the regulator need only observe the
equilibrium permit price, not hard-to-obtain information on ®rms' control costs.
Furthermore, since all ®rms face the same permit price, as long as penalties are applied
uniformly, uniform monitoring with probability p 0 guarantees that all ®rms will provide
truthful reports of their emissions. Thus, from the perspective of inducing accurate
emissions reporting, the equilibrating nature of competitive transferable permit systems
implies that an enforcement authority need not use fundamental differences among ®rms

to target its enforcement strategy. We shall see that this extends to inducing complete
emissions compliance as well.
3.3. Effective Enforcement with Self-Reporting
The focus on incentive-compatible policy mechanisms is usually justi®ed by appealing
to the Revelation Principle (Myerson 1979)Ðloosely, for a wide range of policy
objectives, a policy that elicits truthful reports of key pieces of information cannot be
dominated by one that does not. We have a more pressing reason for focusing on incentivecompatibility. As the following proposition indicates, a regulator cannot hope to achieve
complete emissions compliance unless p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0.
Proposition 3: If p4p 0g0 0  f 0 0, each ®rm is non-compliant; that is, e4l for
every ®rm.
Proof of Proposition 3: Toward a contradiction, suppose that p4p 0g0 0  f 0 0, but
a ®rm is compliant (i.e., e  l). Using (2b) and (2c), if emissions compliance is optimal,
yl  p ÿ f 0 0  m  0;

8

yr  f 0 0 ÿ p 0g0 0  f 0 0  b ÿ m  0:

9

and

Substitute (9) into (8) to obtain
yl  p ÿ p 0g0 0  f 0 0  b40:

10

The sign of (10) follows because p4p 0g0 0  f 0 0 and b  0, and contradicts (8).
Therefore, if p4p 0g0 0  f 0 0, a ®rm chooses to be non-compliant. Since there is
nothing speci®c to a particular ®rm in equations (8), (9) and (10), the conclusion applies
to all ®rms. Q.E.D.
Equation (10) indicates that a ®rm that contemplates full emissions compliance in the
absence of incentive-compatible enforcement will ®nd that at e  l the marginal expected
cost of its permit demand is strictly positive yl 40. Thus, because its choice of emissions
is ®xed at the solution to c0 e  p  0 (Proposition 1), the ®rm is motivated to hold fewer
permits, thereby choosing to be non-compliant. Furthermore, it does not provide a truthful
report of its resulting emissions violation because it does not have the proper incentive to
do so.
Although an incentive-compatible enforcement strategy is necessary to achieve full
emissions compliance, it is not suf®cient. An additional condition is needed.
Proposition 4: Full emissions compliance is achieved if and only if

A p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0;
and
B p  f 0 0:
Proof Proposition 4: We have already established the necessity of (A) to induce full
emissions compliance. Given (A), we ®rst show that p ÿ f 0 0  0 is also necessary. Given
truthful reporting, (2b) reveals that a ®rm's optimal demand for permits must satisfy
yl  p ÿ f 0 e ÿ l  m  0:

11

If a ®rm is compliant, e  r  l, which, from (2e), implies m  0. Clearly, p ÿ f 0 0  0 is
therefore necessary to satisfy (11) when a ®rm is compliant. To establish suf®ciency,
suppose that e  r4l while p ÿ f 0 0  0. From (2e), r4l implies m  0. Then, since e4l
implies f 0 e ÿ l4f 0 0; yl  p ÿ f 0 e ÿ l50. However, yl 50 contradicts (11). Again,
since the proof of the proposition for a single ®rm does not rely on anything speci®c to that
®rm, the proposition applies to all ®rms. Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 is the primary result of this paper and we shall discuss its signi®cance and
limitations at length in the next section. Before we move on, however, let us make a few
observations. First, given an incentive-compatible enforcement strategy [part (A) of the
proposition], a non-compliant ®rm reports its emissions violation truthfully and pays the
certain penalty f e ÿ l. Thus, if p  f 0 0 so that part (B) of the proposition holds, the
permit price is less than the marginal penalty of any emissions violation; therefore, every
®rm chooses their emissions and permits to be compliant because non-compliance is more
costly than purchasing enough permits to cover their emissions. However, if p4f 0 0,
equation (11) implies that a ®rm chooses its emissions violation so that p  f 0 e ÿ l.
Perhaps surprisingly, since every ®rm faces the same permit price, as long as they face the
same penalties for emissions violations as well, they all choose the same emissions
violation.
Notice that Becker's (1968) seminal insight about the tradeoff between monitoring and
penalties can be applied to the enforcement strategy proposed in Proposition 4. If
monitoring is costly but setting penalties is not, the enforcement cost of maintaining full
emissions compliance can be minimized by setting the marginal penalties at arbitrarily
high levels so that the audit probability can be made arbitrarily small. There are very sound
theoretical and ethical reasons for why this strategy is not very practical and, perhaps for
these reasons, the strategy is not observed in actual practice.12
However, relative to going prices for SO2 allowances, the marginal penalty for
emissions violations in the SO2 Trading program is quite high, implying that the audit
12 See Cohen (1999, section 3) and Macauley and Brennan (1998, section 3.3.2) for discussions of the
limits to setting arbitrarily high penalties, both with particular reference to enforcing environmental
policies.

probability necessary to achieve complete emissions compliance can be very low. In 1998,
prices for allowances ranged between $100 and $200 per allowance. In the same year the
monetary penalty for excess emissions was $2581 per unit. In addition, any excess
emissions would have been offset in 1999, suggesting an additional per unit penalty for
forfeited 1999 allowances equal to the present value of these allowances. Assuming that
this value is roughly equal to 1998 permit prices, the effective marginal penalty for an
emissions violation would have been in the neighborhood of $2650 to $2750. Note that
part (B) of Proposition 4 is easily satis®ed and, with a probability of detecting a violation
as low as 0.08, part (A) would be satis®ed as well. Given the effort expended on
monitoring and the stringency of the reporting requirements in the SO2 program, the actual
probability of detecting emissions violations is probably much higher. It is therefore quite
clear why ®rms in the SO2 program have chosen full emissions compliance.

4. Implications for Designing Enforcement Strategies for
Transferable Permit Systems
Proposition 4 reveals that effective enforcement of a transferable permit system with selfreporting has two requirements. Firms should be audited with probability p 0, and
marginal penalties for slight emissions and reporting violations, f 0 0 and g0 0, should be
chosen so that p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0. Furthermore, the marginal penalty for a slight
emissions violation should not be less than the equilibrium permit price; that is, p  f 0 0.
The ®rst condition guarantees a truthful report of any emissions violation [Proposition 2
and the discussion that follows], which is necessary for ®rms to have the proper incentive
to choose complete emissions compliance [Proposition 3]. Given incentive-compatible
enforcement, the second condition guarantees complete emissions compliance
[Proposition 4]. These conditions have strong implications for the value of self-reporting,
the desirability of targeted monitoring, and useful criteria for setting penalties in
transferable permit systems.13
4.1. The Value of Self-Reporting in Enforcing Transferable Permit Systems
Each of the normative analyses of the consequences of self-reporting in the enforcement
of standards (Malik 1993; Kaplow and Shavell 1994; Livernois and McKenna 1999) have
found that self-reporting can reduce monitoring costs because the report provides
information to the enforcement agency that it can use to target its monitoring effort.
However, targeted monitoring is not appropriate in our context because, as indicated by
the discussion immediately following Proposition 4, with incentive-compatible
enforcement, all ®rms choose the same emissions violation, whether it is a zero violation
when p  f 0 0, or the same positive violation when this condition does not hold.

13 Our discussions of the implications for targeted monitoring and setting penalties apply as well to
enforcement without self-reporting. However, the suggestions that we make in subsections 4.2 and 4.3
have not, to our knowledge, been presented elsewhere.

Therefore, in cases when a regulator can ensure truthful reports, there is no variation in
violations, and hence, there is no role for differentiated monitoring effort.
Let us now consider perfect enforcement of a transferable permit system without selfreporting to see if we can identify other potential bene®ts of the self-reporting
requirement. Assume that in the absence of a self-reporting requirement, an enforcement
authority bases its choice of audit probability on the number of permits a ®rm holds;
thus a ®rm is audited with probability p I. Presuming perhaps that a ®rm with fewer
permits is more likely to be non-compliant, let us assume that p I is non-increasing.
Then:
Proposition 5: In a transferable emissions permit system without a self-reporting
requirement, a ®rm is compliant if and only if p  p l f 0 0.
Versions of this result have been presented elsewhere (Malik 1990; vanEgteren and
Weber 1995; Stranlund and Dhanda 1999) so we have relegated its proof to the
appendix.
As in the case of a self-reporting requirement, complete emissions compliance without
self-reporting can be achieved only if p  f 0 0. Assume satisfaction of this condition
under both regimes. From Proposition 4, de®ne pr  p 0  p=g0 0  f 0 0 as the
minimum audit probability necessary to achieve complete emissions compliance with a
self-reporting requirement, given ®xed marginal penalties. From Proposition 5, the
corresponding audit probability without self-reporting is pnr  p=f 0 0. In both cases, if
penalties are applied uniformly across ®rms, audit probabilities should also apply
uniformly across ®rmsÐthere is no role for targeting monitoring effort at different ®rms.
Since pr and pnr differ only in the application of a marginal penalty for a slight reporting
violation, g0 0, without this penalty the monitoring requirement under both regimes is the
same. Therefore, the self-reporting requirement does not affect monitoring costs in the
absence of a penalty for reporting violations. On the other hand, if a penalty for reporting
violations is available, the minimum audit probability necessary to achieve full emissions
compliance is less with a self-reporting requirement. Therefore, assuming that the cost of
an audit is the same with and without the self-reporting requirement, the application of a
penalty for reporting violations in addition to a penalty for emissions violations implies
that a self-reporting requirement can lower the costs of monitoring for complete emissions
compliance.
Let us brie¯y examine how the monitoring expenditure saved by the self-reporting
requirement varies with key parameters. Let the number of ®rms under a transferable
permit system be n, and suppose for simplicity that the cost of an audit under both regimes
is w. The value of the self-reporting requirement that is due to lower monitoring costs is
then wn pnr ÿ pr . Substituting pr  p=g0 0  f 0 0 and pnr  p=f 0 0 yields

g0 0
wn p ÿ p   wpn 0
f 0  g0 0  f 0 0
nr

r



as the value of the self-reporting requirement.

12

Because fewer ®rms need to be audited with a self-reporting requirement, the value of
the requirement is increasing in the cost of an audit. Equation (12) also indicates that the
value of the self-reporting requirement is increasing in the equilibrium permit price. Since
the equilibrium permit price is an indicator of the dif®culty of meeting an aggregate
emissions standard, the value of a self-reporting requirement is increasing in the
stringency of the aggregate emissions standard, and the dif®culty with which ®rms reduce
their emissions (i.e., their marginal abatement costs).
The value of the self-reporting requirement is also increasing in the number of ®rms, in
part because the additional number of ®rms that need to be audited in the absence of a selfreporting requirement, npnr ÿ npr , is increasing in the number of ®rms. In addition, as
long as the aggregate number of permits in circulation remains constant, there is an
indirect price effect because more ®rms put upward pressure on the equilibrium permit
price, which in turn increases the relative value of a self-reporting requirement.
Finally, it is easy to show that (12) is increasing in g0 0 and decreasing in f 0 0. Since
the value of a self-reporting requirement stems from the regulator's ability to apply
penalties for reporting violations in addition to penalties for emissions violations, the value
of the self-reporting requirement is increasing in the marginal penalty for a small reporting
violation. On the other hand, because penalties for emissions violations are applied under
both regimes, the value of the self-reporting requirement is decreasing in the marginal
penalty for a slight emissions violation.
4.2. Targeting Monitoring Effort in Transferable Emissions Permit Systems
We have indicated at a number of points in the analysis that the requirements for
effective enforcement do not depend on anything speci®c to particular ®rms. The
enforcement strategy that we propose is tied to the equilibrium permit price rather than to
individual marginal control costs. This is due to the equilibrating nature of frictionless and
competitive transferable permit systems: in any equilibrium, each ®rm equates its
marginal abatement cost to the permit price, and hence, the ®rms' marginal abatement
costs are all equal. In equilibrium, there is simply no heterogeneity in the ®rms' marginal
abatement costs that a regulator can use to target its monitoring effort. This implies that as
long as ®rms face the same permit price and penalties are ®xed and applied uniformly,
monitoring should also be uniform; each ®rm should be audited with the same probability.
This suggests further that knowledge of the ®rms' marginal abatement costs is not relevant
for the design of an effective enforcement strategy. Thus, the fact that ®rms are likely to be
better informed about their control costs than a regulator has no bearing on the regulator's
choice of enforcement strategy.
The same is not true of enforcing emissions standards. When faced with an emissions
standard, the bene®t to a ®rm of non-compliance is the emissions-control costs it would
have to incur to be compliant; therefore, a ®rm's marginal abatement cost function
indicates exactly its marginal bene®t of non-compliance. In fact, given ®xed penalties that
are applied uniformly, a ®rm with high marginal abatement costs is more likely to be noncompliant. Thus, to minimize the monitoring costs of achieving full compliance to
emissions standards, a regulator will want to target more of its monitoring effort at ®rms
with higher marginal abatement costs. Of course, to target monitoring perfectly, a

regulator must have perfect knowledge of the marginal abatement costs of all regulated
®rms. In most cases, this information will be impossible to obtain.14
The result that effective enforcement of a transferable permit system does not require
targeted monitoring depends on the result that all ®rms face the same price for an
emissions permit. However, if there are signi®cant transaction costs associated with
trading permits, ®rms may face different effective prices. A transactions cost that varies
with the number of permits transferred between a buyer and a seller drives a wedge
between the price a buyer pays for an emissions permit and the price a seller receives
(Stavins 1995). Consequently, buyers of permits have a greater incentive to be noncompliant than sellers. Thus, effective enforcement in the presence of transaction costs
would likely involve monitoring buyers of permits more closely than sellers.
Another imperfection that might cause a regulator to seek a targeted monitoring strategy
is the case in which a ®rm has market power in a transferable permit system. In a model of
a dominant ®rm and a competitive fringe that is based upon Hahn's (1984) work, van
Egteren and Weber (1996) show that the initial allocation of permits to the dominant ®rm
can affect the compliance decisions of all ®rms. The authors obtained their results under
the assumption of a ®xed enforcement strategy that is insuf®cient to generate complete
emissions compliance. However, their analysis suggests that effective enforcement in the
presence of market power will likely involve targeted monitoring according to whether or
not a ®rm has market power, as well as the initial allocation of permits.
4.3. Setting Penalties in Transferable Emissions Permit Systems
A particularly attractive feature of competitive transferable permit systems is that they
are expected to adjust more easily to a variety of changes than other emissions-control
policies. Changes in ®rms' marginal control costs, technological advance, industry growth
and decline, and in¯ationary pressures are accommodated automatically by a transferable
permit system through changes in the equilibrium permit price. In contrast, emissions
taxes and standards that are designed to meet an aggregate emissions target must be
adjusted constantly in response to these changes. (Hanley, Shogren and White 1997,
pp. 94±95; Baumol and Oates 1988, p. 178). However, since effective enforcement of a
competitive transferable permit system requires p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0, if the penalties
are ®xed, p 0 must be tied directly to the equilibrium permit price, and hence, must keep
pace with its ¯uctuations. This may be a dif®cult task for a regulator.
It may be more sensible to tie marginal penalties directly to the equilibrium permit price
so that the monitoring requirement can be stabilized. For example, suppose that the
marginal penalty for a reporting violation is chosen to be g0 e ÿ r  gp, where g40, and
the marginal penalty for an emissions violation is f 0 e ÿ l  fp, where f  1 to satisfy the
14 This difference between enforcing emissions standards and transferable permit systems also holds in a
different policy context. Garvie and Keeler (1994) show that a budget-constrained regulator that wants to
maximize compliance to emissions standards should direct more monitoring effort at ®rms with high
marginal abatement costs. Stranlund and Dhanda (1999) apply the model of Garvie and Keeler to the
enforcement of a transferable permit system and ®nd that enforcement targeting based on marginal
abatement costs is not productive.

requirement that p  f 0 0. From the requirement that p  p 0g0 0  f 0 0, a constant
audit probability p  1= g  f will guarantee accurate emissions reports and complete
emissions compliance, and is independent of ¯uctuations of the equilibrium permit price.
This particular suggestion may be somewhat simplistic because, if the compliance period is
long enough, say one year as in the SO2 Allowance Trading and RECLAIM programs,
permit prices will ¯uctuate to some degree during the year but marginal penalties need to be
tied to a single price. In practice, penalties could be tied to some average price during the
year; for example, the regulation may include a provision that the penalties in a given year
will be some constant multiple of the highest of the average monthly prices during the year.
Choosing the highest average monthly price will provide a stronger deterrent against
noncompliance than, say, the simple average price during the year.
Our recommendation to tie marginal penalties to the equilibrium permit price
corresponds well with suggestions that penalties for violations of environmental
regulations be based on the economic gain of the violation to the offender (Wasserman
1992; for a discussion see Cohen 1999, section 3.5). Since the equilibrium permit price is
the marginal cost for a ®rm to achieve full emissions compliance, it also represents the
marginal gain from being non-compliant. Gain-based penalties are usually considered to
enforce emissions standards, but there is a major difference between applying the gainbased criterion to enforce standards and to enforce transferable permits. A gain-based
penalty for violations of emissions standards requires that the enforcement authority
estimate the violators' marginal control costs on a case-by-case basis. For transferable
permits the enforcement authority need only observe the equilibrium permit price. In most
cases, the latter information will be much easier to obtain.
Of course, tying marginal penalties to the permit price depends on the existence of a
relatively ef®cient permit market; a market in which a large number of trades take place at
roughly the same price. In thin markets in which trades may take place at widely divergent
prices, our suggestion has less appeal because it may be dif®cult to identify a single price
upon which to set penalties. The suggestion may also be problematic in markets in which
some set of ®rms can exercise some in¯uence on the market price. If penalties are tied to
the permit price, then ®rms with market power will be able to exert in¯uence on the
resulting penalties as well. It is not clear how our suggestion may fare in the presence of
market power, but we think it is an important issue to explore in the future.

5. Conclusion
We have developed a number of new results that should be helpful in the design of
enforcement strategies for market-based environmental policies. We have shown that a
self-reporting requirement can conserve monitoring costs, not because it allows for
targeted monitoring as in the context of enforcing emissions standards, but because it
allows the application of a penalty for a reporting violation that serves as an additional
deterrent to non-compliance. We have also noted that there appears to be no justi®cation
for targeted monitoring as long as the permit market is truly competitive. Additional
analysis is necessary to identify the appropriate place for targeted monitoring in the
presence of signi®cant transaction costs and market power. Lastly, we have suggested that

policymakers consider tying penalties in transferable permit systems to the current
equilibrium price of permits. Doing so would allow enforcement authorities to choose a
monitoring strategy that is effective, yet independent of permit market ¯uctuations.
Of course, our analysis can and should be extended in a number of directions. We have
mentioned a number of these throughout the paper that we feel are the most important.
Pursuing these and other extensions will provide policymakers with a more complete
conceptual foundation for designing enforcement strategies for market-based policies that
achieve acceptable levels of compliance in a cost-effective manner.

Appendix
Proof of Proposition 5: In the absence of a self-reporting requirement a ®rm chooses its
emissions and permits to
min c e  p l ÿ l0   p lf e ÿ l;
s:t: e  l40:
The Lagrange equation is y  c e  p l ÿ l0   p lf e ÿ l ÿ Z e ÿ l. Assuming l40,
the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are:
ye  c0 e  p lf 0 e ÿ l ÿ Z  0;

A.1

yl  p  p0 lf e ÿ l ÿ p lf 0 e ÿ l  Z  0;

A.2

yZ  l ÿ e  0; Z  0; Z6 l ÿ e  0:

A.3

If a ®rm is compliant, (A.2) becomes yl  p ÿ p lf 0 0  Z  0. Since Z  0, a ®rm is
compliant only if p ÿ p lf 0 0  0. Furthermore, suppose that e4l while
p ÿ p lf 0 0  0. Since e4l; Z  0. Furthermore, e4l and p ÿ p lf 0 0  0 imply
p ÿ p lf 0 e ÿ l50. Therefore, since p0 l  0, yl  p  p0 lf e ÿ l ÿp lf 0 e ÿ l50,
indicating that non-compliance is a sub-optimal choice when p ÿ p lf 0 0  0. Thus,
given p0 l  0, a ®rm is compliant if and only if p ÿ p lf 0 0  0. Q.E.D.
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